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Abstract There is much debate about the effect of com-
petition in healthcare and especially the effect of compe-
tition on the quality of healthcare, although empirical
evidence on this subject is mixed. The Netherlands pro-
vides an interesting case in this debate. The Dutch system
could be characterized as a system involving managed
competition and mandatory healthcare insurance. Infor-
mation about the quality of care provided by hospitals has
been publicly available since 2008. In this paper, we
evaluate the relationship between quality scores for three
diagnosis groups and the market power indicators of hos-
pitals. We estimate the impact of competition on quality in
an environment of liberalized pricing. For this research, we
used unique price and production data relating to three
diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, bladder
tumor) produced by Dutch hospitals in the period
2008–2011. We also used the quality indicators relating to
these diagnosis groups. We reveal a negative relationship
between market share and quality score for two of the three
diagnosis groups studied, meaning that hospitals in com-
petitive markets have better quality scores than those in
concentrated markets. We therefore conclude that more
competition is associated with higher quality scores.
Keywords Competition  Quality  Hospitals  Market
structure
JEL Classification I 110  L 110  L 130
Introduction
Many countries are facing high healthcare costs, which are
also continuing to rise steadily. As a response to these
trends, reforms have been implemented with the aim of
controlling healthcare costs and improving the quality of
care, and it seems likely that further such reforms will be
put in place. The Netherlands is an example of a country
that has recently reformed its healthcare system. The
reforms took place in 2006 and included essential com-
petitive elements [28].
The main objectives of the reforms to the healthcare
system were to reduce costs, increase the quality and
accessibility of healthcare and, at the same time, to main-
tain an equitable healthcare system. Today, the Dutch
system can be characterized as a system of managed
competition in which health insurers compete for sub-
scribers and healthcare providers compete for contracts
with health insurers. A prospective payment system has
been implemented to support negotiations between health
insurers and hospitals. The prices of the hospital products,
called Diagnosis Treatment Combinations, are in part set
by the government. Prices for complex and relatively low-
volume care are regulated (representing around 30% of
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hospital production in 2012). Other prices (mainly for
elective care) have been liberalized and are set after
negotiations between insurers and hospitals [3, 29].
Any healthcare system requires quality information
regarding the care provided [33]. For this, an adequate
system of outcome and quality measurements is necessary
and information based on the insights provided by this
system must be available to consumers. In the Netherlands,
quality information became publicly available in 2008 via
the website http://www.KiesBeter.nl. Since then, con-
sumers have been able to compare the quality of treatment
for specific medical conditions at all Dutch hospitals [32].
Consumers are obliged to take out basic health insurance
covering all basic healthcare including hospital care.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between
competition and quality indicators for hospital products in
a market in which prices are negotiated between health
insurers and hospitals. We contribute to the literature in
several ways. We contribute to our knowledge of the
relationship between competition and quality. The majority
of the existing literature on this subject focuses on the US
and UK healthcare systems (for example
[5, 6, 14, 21, 23, 24, 26]. We, however, examine a Euro-
pean country with mandatory health insurance. Secondly,
we assess the impact of competition on quality in an
environment of liberalized prices. For this research, we
used unique price and production data relating to three
diagnosis groups (cataract, adenoid and tonsils, bladder
tumor) produced by Dutch hospitals and Independent
Treatment Centers in the period 2008 to 2011. Some
928,544 claims with a total revenue of 1.3 billion euros
were examined. Thirdly, most other papers do not model
competition.1 We use a model to measure market power in
a framework that is rooted in economic theory [12].
Fourthly, we have also taken into account the Independent
Treatment Centers (ITCs), which have entered the market
in recent years, when measuring market power; many
studies do not take the rising number of ITCs into account
[7].
A total of 178 ITCs were licensed to provide health care
services in the Dutch hospital market. Particularly in the
field of ophthalmology, it is important to include ITCs in
this research because ITCs are responsible for more than
10% of the market for cataract treatments [22].2 The results
reveal a negative relationship between market share and
quality scores, meaning that hospitals in competitive mar-
kets achieve higher scores on quality than those in con-
centrated markets. The paper will proceed as follows. In
‘‘Institutional context’’ we will give a brief introduction of
the institutional context of the healthcare system in the
Netherlands. In ‘‘Literature’’, we will provide an overview
of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. We will
then proceed to describe our estimation strategy and data in
‘‘Estimation strategy’’, while the results are given in ‘‘Es-
timation results’’ and ‘‘Further examination of the empiri-
cal model’’. ‘‘Conclusion and discussion’’ will outline our
conclusions.
Institutional context
In 2006, the healthcare system in the Netherlands under-
went extensive reform when managed competition was
introduced.3 The system is based on two fundamental pil-
lars: competition and solidarity. The basic concept is that
insurers compete for policy holders and healthcare provi-
ders compete for contracts with insurers. The idea is that
health insurers contract with individual health profession-
als and healthcare institutions, and negotiate terms relating
to service delivery, price, quality, and volume of the health
care production [27]. The selective contracting of health
care providers is permitted. In order to support the nego-
tiations between hospitals and insurers, a prospective
payment system was put in place. Quality information for
different hospital treatments was also made publicly
available.
To guarantee both income solidarity and risk solidarity,
the government introduced a mandatory health insurance
scheme for the entire population in 2006. The Health
Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet 2005) includes sev-
eral requirements that safeguard equal access to healthcare
for everyone. The act obliges citizens to buy a basic ben-
efits package from a private insurance company and obli-
ges insurers to accept clients without premium
differentiation. This basic benefits package is legally
defined and includes hospital care, general practitioner
care, dental care for children under 18 years, obstetrician
care, maternity home care, ambulance services, and cura-
tive mental healthcare. The premium for this basic package
is roughly 50% of the expected health care cost per capita.
The other 50% is paid to the government as an income-
dependent premium. The government pays the sum of the
income-dependent premiums into a risk adjustment fund.
This fund redistributes the money via risk-adjusted pay-
ments to the insurers. The system involves virtually no co-
payments: the government currently prescribes a manda-
tory deductible of €375 and an optional deductible (be-
tween €0 and €500). In the period that our research relates
to (2008–2011), the mandatory deductible increased from
1 As a proxy, many papers use the number of hospitals in a given
geographic radius.
2 Unfortunately, we do not have quality information of the ITCs. 3 This paragraph is partially based on [18].
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€150 to €170, and the optional deductible was between €0
and €500.4
Literature
Theoretical model
Economic theory on quality levels is highly equivocal and
quality levels seem to be highly dependent on the market
structures that are in place. Hospitals providing comparable
health services may vary in the level of price-quality pro-
vided. It is important to identify the factors that drive this
relationship. In price-regulated markets, quality is the only
dimension on which one can compete. In this setting,
quality levels depend on whether price-cost margins are
positive or negative [12]. In non-price-regulated markets,
where providers are able to determine price and quality
level, quality levels depend on elasticities of demand for
price and quality. If quality information is not transparent,
competition will focus on the price dimension [24].
For our setting, which involves managed competition,
Gaynor and Town [12] provide a relevant theoretical
model. Given that in the Netherlands hospitals and insurers
bargain with each other, it is most useful to analyze com-
petition and quality through a bargaining framework.
Gaynor and Town [12] (pages 566–568) present a model by
which hospital and insurers bargain on price and hospitals
are allowed to determine quality levels. In this framework,
an insurer constructs a network of hospitals by bargaining
with hospitals for their inclusion in that network. Insurers
sell this network of hospitals to consumers through a health
plan. The desirability of a network to a consumer depends
the value that he/she attaches to the hospitals that are
included in that network in the event that he or she needs
treatment.
The bargaining model of Gaynor and Town [12] consists
of four phases.
1. Each hospital determines its quality level
2. Insurers and hospitals negotiate prices (if they agree,
the hospital can become part of the health plan
network)
3. Patients choose a health plan based on their
preferences
4. In the event that they need treatment, patients choose a
hospital from the network
Gaynor and Town [12] find that the impact of competition
on quality is generally ambiguous. However, in the event
that hospital demand is not responsive to price—which is
actually the case in our setting, see ‘‘Institutional con-
text’’—then the impact of competition on quality is posi-
tive. Any increase in competition induces all hospitals to
increase their quality. On balance, the effect of this
increase in competition on hospitals’ prices depends on
their relative bargaining position after their increase in
quality. If their relative bargaining position is unchanged,
then there will be no price effect. However, if there is a
change in their relative bargaining position, due to, for
example, differences in their marginal costs for achieving
quality standards, then hospital with lower marginal costs
for achieving quality will choose a relatively higher quality
and improve their relative bargaining positions and,
therefore, their prices. Using this framework as a guide for
our empirical model, we would conjecture that in the Dutch
market, we can expect a positive relationship between
quality and competition.
Empirical literature
Various studies have examined the relationship between
competition and quality in relation to price negotiations
between hospitals and health insurers. In their literature
review, Gaynor and Town [12] conclude that the impact of
competition on quality remains ambiguous, ranging from
negative to positive. Most studies undertaken originate in
the US or UK. Lyon [19] examined the relationship
between competition and quality for the managed care
market. Lyon [19] showed that when there is greater price
competition, price and quality are both lower than in tra-
ditional markets. Lyon’s [19] model shows that competi-
tion has a positive impact on quality when patients have a
free choice of hospitals. When patients hospital choice is
restricted, competition may lead to excessively low or high
quality. Also, Gowrisankaran and Town [14] estimate the
effect of competition on quality by comparing Medicare
patients and HMO patients. Their assumption is that hos-
pitals provide the same quality for all patients and that a
change in competition will influence changes in quality for
the hospital as a whole. Hospitals cannot influence Medi-
care prices because the government sets prices. For
Medicare patients, the level of reimbursement determines
whether hospitals will adjust quality (when the price is
lower than cost, hospitals are incentivized to reduce quality
and vice versa). For two diagnoses, pneumonia and acute
myocardial infarction, these authors use mortality rates as
quality measure. The results show that for HMO patients,
competition leads to lower hospital prices and higher
hospital quality. For Medicare patients, their results show
that competition leads to lower quality, indicating that
4 Mandatory deductibles were €150 in 2008, €155 in 2009, €165 in
2010, and €170 in 2011. Since prices for most hospital treatments are
higher than the deductible and insurers do not differentiate
deductibles on the basis of the hospital chosen, patients are not
price-sensitive with respect to hospital treatment.
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Medicare margins are (excessively) small. Encinosa and
Didem [8] estimated logit regressions to examine the
relationship between safety outcomes and hospital profit
margins and find a gradual negative relationship, meaning
that pressure on hospital finance leads to lower quality.
Escarce et al. [9] examine the relationship between com-
petition and quality in three US states with different levels
of HMO penetration. Their logistic regression models
reveal a positive relationship in states with the highest
average market competition measures and HMO
penetration.
Propper et al. [24] examine the effect of price compe-
tition on quality with a difference-in-difference model in
the UK. In this model, competing hospitals are compared
with non-competing hospitals based on geographic loca-
tion. They use AMI mortality as an unobserved quality
measure. This study finds a negative relationship between
competition and AMI death rate. However, the relationship
between an observed quality measure (the waiting list for
elective care procedures) and competition is positive.
An important contribution outside the hospital market is
Forder and Allan [10], who study the impact of competition
on quality and price of English care and nursing homes.
They show that competition reduces both quality and prices
in nursing homes. A major difference in the institutional
setting, however, is that a considerable number of the
residents in these nursing homes are ‘self-payers’, which
makes consumers much more price-sensitive than the
consumers in studies on the hospital market.
In the Netherlands, two papers have examined the
competition-quality relationship [2, 15]. Bijlsma et al. [2]
used outcome and process-quality indicators after managed
competition was introduced in Dutch hospitals. They used
the Basic Data Set of the Health Inspectorate from the
period 2004–2008. Most of these indicators were at the
hospital level rather than at the diagnosis level. Competi-
tion is based on fixed radius measures. Although the rela-
tionship between competition and some process indicators
was positive and significant, they do not find a quality-
competition relationship in the quality of outcomes. Hei-
jink et al. [15] studied the relationship between price,
volume, and quality for elective cataract surgery in the
Netherlands and found little variation in cataract quality
indicators between Dutch hospitals after the introduction of
price competition [15]. Other Dutch studies analyzed the
relationship between patient hospital choice and quality
with publicly available quality data. Both studies found
significant patient sensitivity to quality data [33, 1].
Varkevisser et al. [33] examined this relationship specifi-
cally in relation to angioplasty treatments, which is a
treatment for which hospitals require government permis-
sion and which is price-regulated. Even when quality
information is noisy (for example because quality data is
not adjusted for case mix), this relationship holds. Beukers
et al. [2] studied this relationship with regard to hip
replacements in the period 2008–2010. Their logit regres-
sions indicate that although the relationship between
quality and patient hospital choice is significant, travel time
is a more important indicator of patients choice of hospital.
Estimation strategy
Empirical model
To determine the relation between quality and competition,
we estimate a panel data model. We consider the following
general linear model:
yit ¼ xitbþ vit; ð1Þ
where t denotes the year ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . .; TÞ and i denotes the
hospital (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .;N). The independent variables for
hospital i in year t are given by vector xit and the dependent
variable is given by yit. In this model vit ¼ uit þ ci is the
composite error, where ci is the unobserved component and
uit is the idiosyncratic error (see for example [34]). For
each model, we made assumptions on the correlation
between the unobserved component ci and xit. If we allow
these to be correlated, then we have a fixed-effects model
where ci is a parameter that we will estimate. If we assume
that they are uncorrelated then we have a random-effects
model in which we assume a structure for the variance of
vit (see [34]).
In our specific application, we estimated a model for
each diagnosis. For hospital i in year t ðt ¼ 2008; . . .; 2011Þ
we denoted its concentration index by ms (see below for
the definition) and its quality by quality. To control for
possible case mix differences between hospitals, we
included the fraction of females (frac femaleit) and the
fraction of patients who are 65 years old or older
(frac 65it). To control for the fact that some hospitals deal
with one dominant health insurer, while other hospitals
deal with several competing insurers, we calculated the
HHI of the insurers that a hospital faces (HHI insit). We
calculated this for, say, hospital i in year t, by summing up
the squared shares that each insurer has in the total revenue
of hospital i in year t. Furthermore, given that teaching
hospitals may treat more severe patients, we included a
dummy variable for teaching hospitals (acadit) and since
quality may depend on volume, we included a dummy for
hospitals with a low volume of patients (lowvolumeit). In
each year, the 25% of hospitals with the lowest volume
were considered as low-volume hospitals.
The estimated model is:
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qualityit ¼ b1msit þ b2frac femaleit þ b3frac 65it
þ b4HHI insit þ b5lowvolumeit þ b6acadit þ vit
ð2Þ
To estimate the relationship between quality and compe-
tition, we needed to measure market power. There has been
a great deal of debate about market definition and the
measurement of market power in the literature. For an
overview, see [12]. Many authors use a rather crude mea-
sure of competition: for example [24], measure competition
as number of hospitals within a 30-min journey controlled
for population density. However, although travel time is an
important factor in hospital choice, choices can also be
influenced by other patient and hospital characteristics.
Gaynor and Vogt [12] propose the use of the Logit
Competition index (LOCI) to measure market power in the
hospital market. The index is based on a weighted average
of a hospitals market share per micro-market. The con-
struction of the competition index starts by modeling the
demand with a choice model. The choice model includes a
utility function which, given characteristics of the con-
sumer and hospital, depends on the utility that a patient
derives from each hospital. The utility depends on both
observable and non-observable consumer and hospital
characteristics. With the logit choice model, it is possible
to calculate the probability that a specific consumer type
will choose a specific hospital. Each group of patients with
similar characteristics (e.g., zip-code, age, gender, diag-
nosis, etc.) forms a micro market.
Under a standard price competition model, the compe-
tition index (LOCI) of hospital j for consumer type t is
given by (see [12])
Kj ¼
X
t
wtjð1  stjÞ
where the weights wtj are the relative importance of each
consumer type
wtj ¼ NtstjX
t
Ntstj
and Nt is the number of consumers of the type t.
The LOCI Kj is a measure of the competitiveness in the
market. The index takes on values between 0 and 1, where
K ¼ 0 means that hospital j is monopolist and K ¼ 1
means that the market is perfectly competitive.
We interpret the LOCI as 1 minus the weighted market
share. To simplify the interpretation of our results with we
use the variable ms as a shorthand for ‘‘market share’’,
which is constructed as ð1  KÞ.
For our purposes, we are able to use actual market share
with the advantage that all non-observable characteristics
are implicitly taken into account. Alternatively, we could
have used estimated market share, with the advantage that
all consumers are taken into account. In our estimations,
we used actual market share. However, the use of actual
market share could potentially lead to endogeneity: hos-
pitals providing good quality may have higher market
share.
Our approach is similar to other articles about the
impact of hospital competition on the quality of healthcare,
e.g., Gowrisankaran and Town [13, 14], Kessler and
McClellan [16], Gaynor et al. [11], and Cooper et al. [6] all
use a market share based on travel distance in their esti-
mations directly or in their IV estimations, in order to avoid
potential endogeneity problems. Our approach is different
from Forder and Allan [10]: they use an administrative
region (Medium-level Super Output Area) as a market to
calculate market share. Since they do not use patient choice
models, they cannot rely on market share based on travel
distance as IV. They therefore use the level of competition
in neighboring areas as IV.
To prevent any endogeneity problems, we also estimate
our regressions with an estimated market share (based on
travel distance only) in an instrumental variable (IV)
approach. Our main contribution is that we define our
micro markets at the level of the quality indicator. Our
micro markets consisted of the group of DTCs that are
linked to the quality indicators. For each quality indicator,
we estimated the relationship between the indicator and the
competition indicator, which meant that we were able to
construct a competition indicator for each quality indicator.
The micro markets are defined by a four-digit zip code and
diagnosis. The narrower a micro market becomes, the more
precise the total market share becomes. However, we
should not make our micro markets smaller than four-digit
zip codes and diagnosis, because then we would have too
few observations per zip code. For example, age is highly
skewed for each diagnosis: the cataract and bladder tumor
diagnosis groups include mainly elderly patients, while the
tonsil diagnosis group consists mainly of younger people.
This indicates that splitting the micro markets across age
categories will not add a great deal of information. Fur-
thermore, there is no reason to assume that choices would
depend on gender.
Quality indicators
For the purposes of this research, we used the quality
indicators from the ‘Dutch Healthcare Transparency Pro-
gram’ (in Dutch: Zichtbare Zorg), which were developed
by the Health Inspectorate in order to support various goals
such as the provision of information for patients and con-
sumers to help them make their choices, purchase infor-
mation for health insurers, control information for the
Inspectorate and improvement information for providers.
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The Dutch Healthcare Transparency Program started in
2007 and in 2008 quality indicators became available for
ten diagnosis groups. The hospitals are required to provide
the registered quality indicators to the government annu-
ally.5 Independent Treatment Centers are not obliged to
provide quality indicators, and, for this reason, we have no
data on the quality indicators of the Independent Treatment
Centers. The quality indicators can be divided into process
indicators, structure indicators, and outcome indicators.
Structure indicators relate to the organization and are
recorded at the hospital level; process indicators measure
the process of activities at the patient level and outcome
indicators measure outcome values at the patient level.
Although outcome indicators are the most important indi-
cators in terms of informational value, the share of out-
come indicators for the Dutch Healthcare Transparency
Program is less than 16%. According to an evaluation
carried out by the Court of Audit (in Dutch: Algemene
Rekenkamer), the indicators of the Dutch Healthcare
Transparency Program indicators for the hospital sector are
stable and it is therefore possible to analyze trends over the
years for which records have been kept [25].
We used quality indicator data from 2008–2011.
Because our time period is relatively short, we used process
and structural indicators (with a ratio scale) rather than
outcome indicators because process and structure indica-
tors can be influenced by hospital management and not
only by medical specialists, and these types of indicators
are also used by insurers [4]. Six selection criteria were
applied to include quality indicators for the diagnosis
groups in our research sample. (1) The diagnoses are not
selected on medical similarity but on whether hospitals can
compete for patients. We used quality indicators for the
diagnosis groups that made up the market segment. In this
segment, the prices for the diagnosis groups are determined
by negotiations between insurers and hospitals. This means
that hospitals are able to compete on price and quality. This
is not the case for all hospital treatments (such as urgent
care). The Dutch Healthcare Authority has selected diag-
noses for the market segment on criteria such as the
transparency of the product definition, price and quality,
the existence of market dynamics including entry and exit,
the absence of undesirable effects and the absence of high
transaction costs [17]. (2) Hospitals have been obliged to
record quality indicators for the diagnosis groups since
2008; however, the number of diagnosis groups has grown
over the years. We selected only the quality indicators that
have been recorded since 2008. This means that the quality
indicators that have been developed by the Health
Inspectorate since 2008 are not part of our selection. (3)
The quality indicators needed to be comparable over the
years. (4) We selected diagnosis groups that involved
surgical intervention. (5) We selected high-volume diag-
nosis groups with over 10,000 treatments per year. (6) We
excluded indicators with categorical values (yes or no
answer). Our final sample consisted of quality indicators
for three diagnosis groups: cataract (ophthalmology), ade-
noid and tonsils (otolaryngology), and bladder tumor
(urology). For bladder tumor, quality indicator data were
available for 2008 to 2010 and for cataract, and data were
available for 2008 to 2011 for adenoid and tonsils. The
three diagnoses are elective care treatments that include
daycare surgery. It should be noted that this is also the case
for the bladder tumor diagnosis because the quality indi-
cator that was used in this study relates to the low-risk
patient group (non-muscle invasive bladder tumor). Table 1
shows the quality indicators that we included in our
analysis.6
The indicators measure various aspects of the quality of
care. For example, for cataract i02-02 measure the com-
plication rate, while i02-03b measure the diagnosis pro-
cess. We can indeed observe that (i) i02-02 have a higher
average score than i02-03b and (ii) i02-02 have a lower
standard deviation than i02-03b. This is unsurprising, since
a one percentage-point change in i02-02 has more direct
clinical relevance than a one percentage-point change in
i02-03b. For this reason, it is more useful to compare
changes in terms of one standard deviation. Note that i02-
02 is an outlier with respect to the standard deviation. The
other indicators have more similar standard deviations and
clinical relevance.
In order to compare the quality indicators over the years
and with one another, we rescaled and aggregated the
indicators as follows: for each year t ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . .; nÞ and
diagnosis group k (k ¼ 1; 2; . . .;K) we calculated a com-
bined quality indicator score per hospital i (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .;N).
First, each indicator h ðh ¼ 1; 2; . . .;HÞ of, say, diagnosis
group k is rescaled to a z-score (z-score of indicators have
an average value of zero and a standard deviation of 1):
zith ¼ ðPith  lthÞ
sdth
where zith is the value of the indicator h of diagnosis group
k for hospital i in year t, lth is the average value of indi-
cator h in year t and sdth is the standard deviation of
indicator h in year t. Note that for all indicators that a high
z-score is associated with high quality of care and low z-
score is associated with low quality of care.
5 Since 2013 the project organization for the Dutch Health Care
Transparency Program has been integrated into the Dutch Quality
Institute.
6 For a careful assessment of the second eye, there should be enough
time between the surgery of the first eye and second eye.
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Secondly, we calculate for each hospital in each year we
calculated an average z-scores for diagnosis group k, which
we denote by qualityitk, by averaging over zith:
qualityitk ¼
PH
h¼1 zith
H
:
We thus interpreted qualityitk as the diagnosis group k (-
combined) quality indicator of hospital i in year t.
Data
This research was based on claims data from 2008 to 2011
from all Dutch hospitals and Independent Treatment Cen-
ters (ITCs). The Dutch hospital market consists of 87
hospitals, two specialized hospitals, and eight academic
hospitals. The total number of ITCs rose from 189 in 2008
to 282 in 2012. Our unique dataset consists of patient-level
data including patient characteristics such as gender, age,
zip code, diagnosis and treatment, hospital characteristics
and hospital contract prices for our three selected diag-
noses. The total number of patients in the period 2008 and
2011 for cataract was 474,410 with a total revenue of 843
million euros. The total number of patients in the period
2008 and 2011 for adenoid and tonsils was 223,177 with a
total revenue of 219 million euros. The total number of
patients in the period 2008 and 2011 for bladder tumor was
46,497 with a total revenue of 244 million euros.
The calculation of the weighted market share was based
on the claims data from the hospitals and Independent
Treatment Centers (ITCs), where we removed those cases
with invalid zip codes (which amounted to less than 1% of
our sample). Thus, when calculating the market share, we
were able to take into account the (potential for) compet-
itive pressure from ITCs. However, as discussed in
‘‘Quality indicators’’, we had no data on the quality indi-
cators for the ITCs. This implies that the analysis of the
quality indicators is restricted to hospitals and excludes the
ITCs. For each diagnosis, we removed those hospitals
where there was no data on quality indicators. Tables 2, 3,
and 4 present the descriptive statistics for the variables
used in our empirical model at the diagnosis level. The
total number of observations ranges from 191 for tonsils to
286 for cataract. For example, the average actual market
share ms for cataract was 0.58 (SD 0.21) with a minimum
of 0.06 and maximum of 0.97 meaning that there are large
differences between the market share of hospitals. The
other diagnoses display comparable actual market share.
The average hospital-insurer HHI is moderately strong and
ranges from 0.39 for cataract, 0.32 for tonsils, and 0.38 for
bladder tumor.
Table 1 Quality indicators
Indicator
code
Description Type Average SD
Cataract
i02-02 Complications: percentage of cataract operations without a posterior capsular rupture (including
vitrectomy)
Process 99.63 0.35
i02-03a Accurate diagnosis of the second eye: percentage of patients undergoing a cataract operation on both
eyes with a gap of more than 28 days between the first and second operation. For a careful
assessment of the second eye there should be enough time between the surgery of the first and
second eye
Process 95.56 8.40
i02-03b Accurate diagnosis of the second eye: percentage of patients undergoing a cataract operation on both
eyes that have (i) a postoperative check of the first surgery before the second operation and (ii) a
gap of more than 14 days between the first operation and the last postoperative check for the first
operation
Process 87.63 23.21
Bladder tumor
i01-02 Vesicoclysis: percentage of non-muscle invasive bladder cancer patients with a trans-urethral
resection of the tumor (TURT) that have a washing out of the urinary bladder within 24 h after the
TURT
Structure 69.98 23.66
Adenoid and tonsils
i10-02 Preoperative consultation: percentage of tonsillectomy patients screened at an anesthesiology
outpatient clinic before tonsillectomy
Process 90.80 23.58
i10-04a Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of inpatient tonsillectomy patients that have their pain
intensity measured every 8 h
Process 84.76 21.61
i10-04b Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of measured inpatient patients without serious pain (i.e.,
Visual Analog Scale for Pain  7 or Numeric Rating Scale  7)
Process 93.32 14.51
i10-04c Postoperative pain measurement: percentage of daycare patients that have been telephoned after their
operation to monitor their pain intensity
Process 75.47 38.63
This table contains for each quality indicator its average score and standard deviation pooled over the years
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As mentioned in ‘‘Quality indicators’’, we have used
standardized quality scores for each diagnosis. The stan-
dardized quality scores ranged between 3:05 and 0.78 for
cataract, between 2:17 and 0.71 for tonsils and between
2:85 and 1.42 for bladder tumor.
We included two hospital characteristics in our
empirical model. Firstly, we used a dummy variable to
control for whether a hospital is a general hospital or
academic (university) hospital, a low-volume dummy, and
insurance-hospital HHI. For each diagnosis, less than 10%
of the hospitals included were academic hospitals. To
control for patient characteristics, we included three
variables: the fraction of female patients, the fraction of
patients that were older than 65 years, and the co-mor-
bidity index. The results differed per diagnosis due to the
characteristics of the condition and the set of hospitals
included in the analysis. The co-morbidity index, which is
defined in this study as the average number of diagnoses,
varied considerably between the diagnoses. The co-mor-
bidity for tonsils had the lowest index of 1.04. The
average number of additional diagnoses for bladder tumor
(3.19) and cataracts (2.18) was higher due to the older
population involved.
Estimation results
Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the estimation results for each
diagnosis group using the pooled OLS estimator, fixed
effect estimator, and random-effects estimator. For each
estimation method, we present two models: a model with
and a model without control variables. Because the esti-
mated standard errors could be heteroskedastic, we used
the Mackinnon and White [20] Heteroskedasticity-Con-
sistent standard errors.
We performed the Hausman test to determine whether
we should select the fixed or random effect model: given
that (i) the fixed effect model is consistent if the unob-
served component and observable variables are correlated
and (ii) the random effect model is inconsistent, the pres-
ence of significant differences in the estimated coefficients
indicates that there is correlation between the unobserved
component and observable variables and, thus, that we
should discard the random-effects model [34]. For all
models, the Hausman test accepts the null hypotheses that
there is no difference between the coefficient of the random
and fixed-effects model (for each model, the p value is
larger than 0.10). This indicates that the random-effects
models are consistent and, therefore that we can use the
results of the random effect models to determine the rela-
tionship between quality indicators and market share.
Table 5 presents the estimation results for bladder tumor
using six different models. The adjusted R-squared of these
models ranges between 0.017 for the fixed effect model and
0.084 for the pooled model. From all the models shown in
Table 5, we can conclude that the weighted market share (1
Table 2 Cataract
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 286 0.58 0.21 0.06 0.97
Quality 286 0.00 0.63 -3.05 0.78
frac_female 286 0.59 0.03 0.51 0.68
frac_65 286 0.83 0.06 0.58 0.91
Com 286 2.18 0.30 1.60 3.17
HHI_ins 286 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.63
Lowvolume 286 0.25 0.43 0 1
Acad 286 0.09 0.28 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the
hospital-year level (2008–2011). We report the average, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum of the variables that we included
in our regression analysis. We also show the total number of obser-
vations for each diagnosis group
Table 3 Adenoid and tonsils
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 191 0.69 0.19 0.12 0.98
Quality 191 0.00 0.59 -2.17 0.71
frac_female 191 0.51 0.03 0.42 0.60
frac_65 191 0.003 0.003 0.00 0.02
Com 191 1.04 0.30 0.53 2.18
HHI_ins 191 0.32 0.09 0.17 0.57
Lowvolume 191 0.25 0.43 0 1
Acad 191 0.07 0.26 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the
hospital-year level (2008–2011). We report the average, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables that we included
in our regression analysis. We also show the total number of obser-
vations for each diagnosis group
Table 4 Bladder tumor
Statistic N Mean SD Min Max
ms 199 0.73 0.15 0.33 0.98
Quality 199 0.00 1.00 -2.85 1.42
frac_female 199 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.45
frac_65 199 0.72 0.06 0.52 0.86
Com 199 2.68 0.46 1.70 4.32
HHI_ins 199 0.38 0.11 0.19 0.71
Lowvolume 199 0.23 0.42 0 1
Acad 199 0.10 0.29 0 1
This table shows summary statistics for each diagnosis group at the
hospital-year level (2008–2010). We report the average, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables that we included
in our regression analysis. We also show the total number of obser-
vations for each diagnosis group
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minus LOCI) is significantly related with scaled quality
score. The estimated coefficients are significant at a level
of 1% for the random-effects models and the pooled effect
model without control variables. The other models are
significant at a level of 5% (fixed effects with control
variables and pooled model with control variables) and the
10% level (fixed effect model without control variables).
This indicates that hospitals in competitive markets have
higher quality scores for bladder tumor, which supports the
hypothesis that greater competition leads to higher quality
scores. Models 2, 4, and 6 include six control variables
which control for the patient characteristics of the hospital
(fraction of female patients, fraction of patients older than
65 years and co-morbidity index) and hospital character-
istics7 including health insurer-hospital HHI, the type of
hospital and low-volume dummy.
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the diagnosis
groups cataracts and adenoid and tonsils. The results of
the models for cataract are comparable to the results for
bladder tumor and reveal a negative relationship between
market concentration and quality scores. Contrary to
what we expected, the models for the diagnosis group
adenoid and tonsils do not show any significant
estimations.
For the cataract and bladder tumor diagnosis groups, we
can show how to interpret the magnitude of the estimated
relationship between quality scores and market share
through an example. Consider the estimated difference in
the quality scores for a hospital with the lowest market
share (i.e., a market share of 0.06 for cataract, see Table 2)
and the hospital with the highest market share (i.e., market
share 0.98 for bladder tumor, see Table 4). Using the
results of the random-effects model for bladder tumor
presented in Table 6, the market share difference of 0.92
translates into a shift in quality scores of -2.06 standard
deviations from the mean (95% confidence-interval:
½3:39;0:73). Similarly, using the results of the random-
effects model for bladder tumor presented in Table 5, the
market share difference of 0.92 translates into a shift in
quality scores of -0.71 standard deviations from the mean
(95% confidence-interval: ½1:35;0:069).
Table 5 Regression results bladder tumor
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 1.275*** 2.058 1.348*** 2.803**
(0.338) (1.347) (0.360) (1.265)
ms -1.731*** -1.764** -2.504* -3.331** -1.841*** -2.241***
(0.492) (0.705) (1.381) (1.695) (0.510) (0.674)
frac_female -1.136 0.066 -0.149
(1.483) (1.262) (1.019)
frac_65 -0.173 -1.975 -1.001
(1.686) (1.765) (1.425)
Com 0.018 -0.241 -0.106
(0.205) (0.159) (0.158)
HHI_ins -1.019 1.469 -0.134
(0.889) (1.217) (0.801)
Lowvolume -0.165 -0.004 -0.200
(0.260) (0.231) (0.188)
Acad -0.126 -0.286
(0.271) (0.300)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 199
R2 0.069 0.088 0.029 0.073 0.050 0.063
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.084 0.017 0.040 0.049 0.060
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-effects model. For each model, we report
two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share regressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional
control variables. We report the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients). We
used data from 2008 to 2010
7 Model 4 has 5 control variables, because the academic hospital
dummy does not variate over the years.
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Robustness check
To check the robustness of our model with aggregated
quality indicators, we also estimated the pooled, fixed-ef-
fects, and random-effects model for each individual quality
indicator separately (not relevant for bladder tumor).
Table 8 shows the estimated market-share coefficients for
each quality indicator. For the sake of clarity, we only
show the estimated market-share coefficients. For each
diagnosis, the sign of the estimated market-share coeffi-
cients are generally consistent with the aggregated model:
negative for cataract and mixed for adenoid and tonsils.
Further examination of the empirical model
In our empirical estimations, we control for differences in
patient and hospital characteristics. However, there is a
potential source of bias in the estimation of the relationship
between weighted market share and quality indicators:
Firstly, as discussed in ‘‘Empirical model’’, hospitals with a
high-quality indicators may attract more patients than
hospitals with low-quality indicators. This means that our
regression models may suffer from an endogeneity problem
and therefore give a biased result.
A potential issue is that hospitals may change their
supply in response to their own or their competitors quality
indicators. However, there were no indications that hospi-
tals significantly restructured their supply:
– no new hospitals or new hospital locations were opened
during the period of our study.
– no hospitals or hospital locations were closed during
the period of our study.
– virtually no hospital increased or decreased their
volume (number of patients) significantly.8
– the presence and entry of independent treatment centers
(ITC) occurred mainly in the cataract diagnosis group.
There was no ITC in the bladder tumor diagnosis group
Table 6 Regression results
cataract
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.122 -2.552* 0.149 -2.631**
(0.145) (1.550) (0.149) (1.237)
ms -0.199 -0.584** -1.481 -1.923** -0.264 -0.772**
(0.259) (0.292) (1.023) (0.883) (0.261) (0.325)
frac_female 2.541 1.208 1.718
(1.925) (2.168) (1.830)
frac_65 1.398 1.354 1.732
(1.294) (1.703) (1.234)
Com 0.072 0.479 0.216
(0.228) (0.377) (0.235)
HHI_ins 0.196 3.568* 0.467
(0.680) (2.082) (0.691)
Lowvolume 0.069 -0.108 -0.017
(0.120) (0.154) (0.127)
Acad -0.196 -0.229
(0.313) (0.287)
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 0.004 0.072 0.014 0.070 0.004 0.051
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.070 0.010 0.048 0.004 0.050
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-
effects model. For each model, we report two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share
regressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional control variables. We
report the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under
coefficients). We used data from 2008 to 2011
8 For each year, we classified all hospitals into four quartiles, based
on the number of patients treated. For cataract and bladder tumor,
there was only one hospital that increased its volume so much that it
moved more than two quartiles.
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Table 7 Regression results
adenoid and tonsils
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Pooled Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.008 0.292 -0.089 -0.064
(0.236) (0.902) (0.283) (0.804)
ms 0.011 -0.068 0.723 0.382 0.099 -0.034
(0.323) (0.562) (1.537) (1.639) (0.383) (0.514)
frac_female -0.388 -0.191 -0.101
(1.452) (1.158) (1.215)
frac_65 -19.167 4.575 -17.188
(25.528) (19.921) (23.471)
Com 0.257 0.379 0.304
(0.198) (0.422) (0.201)
HHI_ins -0.579 1.394 -0.233
(0.602) (1.915) (0.608)
Lowvolume -0.185 0.036 -0.156
(0.231) (0.182) (0.178)
Acad -0.224 -0.228
(0.311) (0.314)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191
R2 0.00001 0.066 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.00001 0.063 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.036
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. We report the results from the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-
effects model. For each model, we report two variants: (i) a simple model with the weighted market share
regressed on the average scaled quality indicator and (ii) a model with additional control variables. We
report the MacKinnon and White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under
coefficients). We used data from the period 2008–2011
Table 8 Disaggregated
regression results for market
share (ms)
Dependent variable
Quality
Pooled Fixed effects Random effects
(2) (4) (6)
Cataract: i02-02 ms 0.040 -2.812 -0.173
Cataract: i02-03a ms -1.024** -0.327 -1.038**
Cataract: i02-03b ms -0.775** -2.707* -0.906**
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-02 ms 0.361 -2.316 0.018
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04a ms 0.901 -3.107 0.744
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04b ms -0.369 3.018 -0.334
Adenoid and tonsil: i10-04c ms -1.150* 3.782 -0.556
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. We report the estimated market-share coefficient from the pooled,
fixed-effects, and random-effects models, which also include the control variables. The estimated coeffi-
cient of the control variables are available from the authors by request. We report the MacKinnon and
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under coefficients). We used data from
the period 2008–2011
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and only four ITCs in the adenoid and tonsils diagnosis
group.
Secondly, hospitals and insurers negotiate the prices of the
products in the diagnosis groups that we examined in a
liberalized setting. An insurer is likely to be interested in
the quality–price ratio and not the quality or price in iso-
lation. Furthermore, as we noted in ‘‘Literature’’, there may
be a relationship between competition and prices through
quality. In this section, we will examine both these issues.
Endogeneity
To test whether our (pooled) regression model suffers from
the endogeneity problem, we used the Wu–Hausman test.
In this test the result of an instrumental variable (IV) model
is compared to the result if the non-IV model.
To estimate an IV model, we must find an instrument for
market share that meets two requirements: (1) it should be
strongly correlated to market share and (2) it should be
uncorrelated to the error term. We took an approach that
has been commonly used in the health economics literature
to deal with the endogeneity problem, namely to deploy IV
instruments based on predicted patient flows (see for
example [6, 16], and [11]). We estimated a conditional
logit model that was based only on the travel time between
the patient and hospital. By excluding the fixed-effects and
other hospital and patient characteristics, we ensured that
our predicted patient flows were exogenous to all patient
preferences other then travel time. This implies that our
patient flows were not influenced by the potential
preferences that patients may have a hospital with a certain
level of quality indicators.
In the conditional logit model, we estimated the utility
that patient t would receive when he or she chose hospital j
ðj; . . .; nÞ, which we denote by Utj. In our case, where we
only use travel time as a predictor, the conditional logit
model is given by:
Utj ¼ atraveltimetj þ tj;
where the residuals  are i.i.d. extreme value (see for
example [31]). We used the same data as in ‘‘Estimation
strategy’’, with the addition of the travel times between the
patient’s home and the hospital. The travel time was cal-
culated as the driving time between the patient’s home and
the hospital zip code. We estimated this model for each
diagnosis group and year (see Table 9 for the estimation
results). For cataract treatment, we took a random sample
of the data for computability. In each year, the sample size
was 50% of the total patient population. As expected, we
found that patients dislike traveling (negative coefficient
for time travel).
Given the fitted utilities U^’s from the estimated model,
we can calculate for each patient the probability P^ij that
this patient (t) chooses hospital j:
P^tj ¼ U^tjPn
k U^tk
:
We can now calculate the simulated weighted market share
for each hospital in each year by replacing stj with Ptj in
‘‘Empirical model’’. To determine the relevance of the
Table 9 Result: conditional
logit model
Dependent variable
Hospital choice
Bladder cancer Cataract Adenoid and tonsil
(1) (2) (3)
2008 traveltime -0.220*** -0.232*** -0.195***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2009 traveltime -0.221*** -0.235*** -0.183***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2010 traveltime -0.231*** -0.236*** -0.179***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 traveltime -0.221*** -0.230*** -0.182***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of patients 2008 9436 53,449 38,621
Number of patients 2009 9854 56,412 38,211
Number of patients 2010 10,122 57,391 39,032
Number of patients 2011 10,319 53,144 40,432
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. For each year and diagnosis group, we report the results from the
conditional logit model with travel time as the only predictor. For cataract we take a random sample. In
each year, the sample size is 50% of the total patient population
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instruments, we determined first-stage F-statistic, see for
example [30]. For each model we found that the first-stage
F-statistic was higher than 56 (p\ 0.001). This indicates
that our instruments were not weak.9 Subsequently, we re-
estimated the pooled regressions in ‘‘Estimation results’’ by
employing the simulated weighted market share as the
instrumental variable (see Table 10 for the results). Given
the IV-estimated coefficients, we could now carry out the
Wu-Hausman test, in which we tested the hypothesis that
there was significant difference between the coefficients
from the pooled model and the coefficients from the IV
model. For each diagnosis group we accepted the hypoth-
esis that there was no difference (p value [0.90). We
performed an additional IV estimation of the random-ef-
fects model (which is preferred to the fixed-effects model,
see above). For bladder tumor, the estimated market-share
coefficient is -2.45 (p = 0.062). For cataract, the estimated
market-share coefficient is -0.94 (p = 0.107). For adenoid
and tonsils, the estimated market-share coefficient is -0.55
(p = 0.35). These IV random-effects coefficient are very
similar to the non-IV random-effects coefficient presented
in the paper. The only difference is that the standard errors
are larger, which is no surprise, since it is much more
difficult to explain the differences than the levels of the
quality indicators with an (IV) regression model. We were
therefore able to conclude that our regression did not suffer
from endogeneity bias.
Prices
As discussed above, there may be a relationship between
prices and quality indicators. However, a comprehensive
examination of the relationship between prices and quality
indicators is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, in this
section we will provide a brief outline of this relationship.
In ‘‘Literature’’, we discussed the bargaining model by
Gaynor and Town [12]. From this model, it follows that the
effect of an increase in competition—through quality—on
price depends on the effect that the increase in quality has
on the relative bargaining position and therefore the prices
charged by a hospital. We do not observe the factors that
determine this effect such as the marginal cost of quality,
see ‘‘Literature’’. Generally, we would expect that hospitals
and insurers to be interested in the quality-to-price ratio
and not price or quality in isolation.
To provide an indication of the relationship between
quality and prices, we estimated the same model as our
quality indicator-market share model in ‘‘Empirical
model’’, where we included the relative prices as the
independent variable rather than market share. We then
estimated the pooled, fixed-effects, and random-effects
models. In general, we found no significant results for the
price variable.10 Our results indicate that, for the hospital
products examined, having a relatively higher (or lower)
quality indicators was not related to higher (or lower)
prices during the period that we studied. We can therefore
conclude that hospitals with better quality indicators are
not compensated by higher prices.
Conclusions and discussion
In this study, we have examined the impact of competition
on the quality of healthcare for the Dutch hospital market.
The Dutch government reformed the health care system in
Table 10 Result: pooled instrumental variable model
Dependent variable
Quality
Bladder tumor Cataract Adenoid and tonsil
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.094 -2.380 0.617
(1.349) (1.560) (0.889)
ms -1.829*** -0.753** -0.603
(0.707) (0.294) (0.545)
frac_female -1.134 2.412 -0.317
(1.485) (1.922) (1.433)
frac_65 -0.159 1.432 -18.521
(1.691) (1.311) (26.590)
Com 0.016 0.046 0.193
(0.205) (0.229) (0.202)
HHI_ins -0.993 0.293 -0.285
(0.889) (0.681) (0.612)
Lowvolume -0.175 0.055 -0.235
(0.261) (0.120) (0.229)
Acad -0.137 -0.243 -0.384
(0.271) (0.325) (0.290)
Observations 199 286 191
R2 0.088 0.071 0.055
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.069 0.053
* p\0:1; ** p\0:05; *** p\0:01. For each diagnosis group, we
report the results from the pooled model, where we use the simulated
weighted market share as an instrument for the weighted market
share. The simulated weighted market share is based on a multinomial
logit model. We report the MacKinnon and White (1985)
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors (in parentheses under
coefficients). We used data from 2008 to 2011
9 Furthermore, a simple correlation analysis shows that the simulated
market share used in the IV are correlated with the original market
share. In each year, the correlation coefficient is between 0.67 and
0.71 for bladder tumor, between 0.72 and 0.90 for adenoid and tonsils,
and between 0.69 and 0.77 for cataract.
10 Only in the random-effects model for bladder tumor we find a
significant (positive) result. The results are available from the authors
on request.
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2006 introducing managed competition in a context where
income and risk solidarity are guaranteed. With this sys-
tem, the government aims to reduce costs and increase
quality of care. Health insurers compete for policy holders
and healthcare providers compete for contracts with health
insurers. We used a unique data set including individual
patient-level claim data and information on quality indi-
cators for three diagnosis groups—cataracts, adenoid, and
tonsils and bladder tumor—produced by Dutch hospitals
and Independent Treatment Centers.
For cataract and bladder tumor, the relationship between
market share and quality scores was found to be significant.
The robustness checks confirmed these results. The
regression estimators for adenoid and tonsils were not
significant. One possible explanation is that the patient
group for adenoid and tonsils is less complex. It is mainly
children younger than 11 years who are treated for adenoid
and tonsils. This type of patient is less complicated and has
fewer additional diagnoses compared to patients with, for
example, bladder tumor (the fraction of patients older than
65 years is 0.72 for bladder tumor, 0.83 for cataract, and
0.01 for adenoid and tonsils, respectively).
Because of endogeneity, we could not include price as
independent variable in our quality indicator models. To
give an indication of this relationship, we replaced the
market-share variable with the relative prices as the inde-
pendent variable. We conclude from these models that
there is no relationship between price and quality scores,
which means that hospitals with higher-quality scores do
not have higher prices.
Overall, we conclude that more competition leads to
better published quality scores. This research does have
some limitations however. For this research, we used
observed quality information that did not include mortality
rates (an outcome indicator). For our research period data,
no data on mortality rates was available. However, since
2014 hospitals are obliged to publish standardized mortality
ratios on their websites. For future research, it would be
interesting to examine the relationship between mortality
rates and competition within the Dutch hospital market.
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